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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the undersigned counsel for appellees represent that the 
named parties, Bonnie K. Tingey, LuAnn Christensen, and Barr 
Christensen, are and have been the only parties to this litigation. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final 
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
(the Honorable Frank G. Noel). Bonnie K. Tingey, the Appellant-
Appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann . § 78-2-2 (j). The Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, "poured" this appeal "over" to this Court, This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-
2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OP ISSUES ON REVIEW 
Did the District Court correctly conclude and thereby properly 
deny Appellant's Motion for New Trial on Damages based on the facts 
that: 
a. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury 
verdict, therefore, the case at bar did not meet the requirements 
of Rule 59(a)(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
b. That the jury verdict was not in violation of law as 
required by Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
c. That the verdict award by the jury was not rendered under 
the influence of passion or prejudice as required by Rule 59(a) (5) , 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
d. That there were no errors in law pursuant Rule 59(a)(7) 
of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
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III. APPLICABLE STANDARD OP APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review for each of these 
issues is whether or not the Trial Court clearly abused its 
discretion in denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. Jensen 
v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 
(Utah 1981) 
IV. STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
The Appellant, Bonnie Tingey, was involved in a three car 
accident on December 30, 1994. The accident occurred just north of 
the 400 South and 900 East intersection in Salt Lake City. 
Defendant, LuAnn Christensen, was driving the family car, 
registered to Barr Christensen. LuAnn had been stopped at the 
light at 4 00 South and was northbound in the inside travel lane. 
Her attention was momentarily distracted and she looked away, when 
her vision returned to directly forward a few seconds later, the 
traffic in her lane had stopped. She applied the brakes but still 
struck Susan Fakkema's Subaru, which was knocked forward bumping 
the rear bumper of Appellant Bonnie Tingey1s vehicle. There 
was absolutely no visible damage to the Tingey 
vehicle. Appellant, Bonnie Tingey, filed suit against LuAnn 
Christensen for damages which she claimed were incurred from the 
bump to her vehicle. Pursuant to §53-3-212, Utah Code Annotated, 
Ms. Tingey also filed suit against Barr Christensen, LuAnn1s 
father, as the owner of the Chevrolet Suburban which LuAnn was 
driving at the time of the accident. 
The Christensens during the course of litigation admitted that 
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the accident was the result of LuAnn Christensen's negligence, but 
did not admit that the Appellant's claimed injuries were a result 
of this accident. 
The issues to be decided by the jury were what injuries, if 
any, the Appellant suffered as a result of this accident and if any 
injury was incurred as a result of this accident, and the amount of 
damages to which Appellant should be entitled, if any. Further, 
whether Appellant suffered any permanent injury as a result of this 
accident. 
The case was presented for trial from March 11 through March 
14, 1996, before a jury, in the courtroom of Third District Court 
Judge, Frank Noel. 
Appellant put on evidence through witnesses and exhibits in 
support of her claim that her injuries were the result of this 
minor impact. Appellees presented evidence through their witnesses 
and exhibits to support their claim that the Appellant's injuries 
were pre-existing and/or arose from causes not related to this 
accident. 
The District Court refused to give Appellant's proposed 
instruction No. 27, which was modeled after a Colorado Jury 
Instruction. This instruction was proposed because Ms. Tingey had 
been involved in two prior accidents, one of which was quite 
severe. That jury instruction would have required the jury to 
apportion Mrs. Tingey's damages between all of the accidents and 
any other causes. Appellees state that is exactly what the jury 
did. If they were unable to apportion it, then it would have 
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required the jury to apportion all damages to this accident, 
however the Appellees contend that the jury was able to apportion 
the damages between the case at bar and the pre-existing accidents 
and/or causes. The jury determined that the damages that were 
sustained as a result of this accident involving LuAnn Christensen 
were limited to the amount of the emergency room expenses $1452.92 
and One Dollar ($1.00) in general damages. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in its denial 
of Appellant's Motion for New Trial on Damages. There was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The jury 
verdict was not in violation of law. Neither passion nor prejudice 
influenced the jury's decision. There were no errors in law. 
Appellant did not meet the burden of proof necessary to 
determine that the subject accident was the proximate cause of the 
claimed injuries. As in most lawsuits, there was testimony 
presented by both Appellant and Appellees on both sides of the 
injury causation issue. The jury as trier of fact must weigh the 
testimony of each witness and, if they so choose, may totally 
discount the testimony of any witness. 
There is no question, after marshalling all of the evidence 
presented at trial, that the jury could reasonably conclude that 
almost all of Appellant's claimed injuries were either pre-existing 
and not exacerbated by the accident in question or arose subsequent 
to this accident and were the result of events other than this 
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accident. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
Did the District Court correctly conclude and thereby properly 
deny Appellant's Motion for New Trial on Damages based on the 
criteria as stated in Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
It is the duty of an appellate court to uphold the verdict of 
the trial court if the verdict is within the bounds of reason and 
is supported by sufficient evidence. As stated in Boden v. 
Suhmann. 327 P.2d 826, 8 Utah 2d 42, (Utah 1958) 
We affirm the responsibility of this court to be 
indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, and not to 
disturb it so long as it is within the bounds of reason, 
in accordance with the principles set forth in the 
companion case of Schneider v. Suhrmann; (FN11) and also 
that it is primarily the prerogative and the duty of the 
trial court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and 
to order any necessary modification thereof. 
Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the limits of 
any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the 
evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if the 
trial court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to make 
the correction on appeal. (FN12) 
In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence to support 
the verdict, and therefore the verdict should be upheld since it is 
within the bounds of reason. Appellant claims that a District 
Court can and should be reversed for failure to grant a new trial 
in circumstances where the jury award is so small, in light of the 
evidence presented, as to be plainly unreasonable or unjust. 
However, this verdict was very much within reason and therefore not 
unreasonable nor unjust. In Moser v. Zions Co-op Merc. Inst, 114 
Utah 58, 65, 197 P.2d 136 (1948), it is stated that: 
If reasonable minds could have found as the jury did from 
the evidence before it, then this court cannot say that 
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the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
party's motion for new trial on the grounds of 
insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. 
Numerous witnesses were presented by the Appellant, However, 
there were sections in each of these witness's testimony that did 
not support the claims made by Appellant. 
Appellant's own accident reconstruction expert, Ronald 
Probert, stated that the rear bumper cover of the Tingey vehicle 
had to be removed to observe any damage. That damage was a slight 
indentation in the styrofoam bumper core. Further, that the damage 
to the bumper was so slight, there wasn't enough damage such that 
he could measure anything. Tr.000396 Additionally, he could not 
tell whether this slight indentation in the styrofoam core came 
from this accident or her rear end accident that occurred in 1989 
in the same vehicle, since o repairs were made to the vehicle 
following the 1989 accident. Tr. 000396-7 
Appellee LuAnn Christensen testified that she exited her 
vehicle at the scene to check with Susan Fakkema, regarding her 
injuries, but was unaware of the involvement of a third vehicle, 
even at that time. It was not until they were filling out the 
police reports, that she was made aware that the Appellant's car 
had even been involved in the accident. Until that time, she 
believed that only the Fakkema vehicle and herself were involved. 
Tr. 000380 . 
Oral Surgeon for the Appellant, Dr. Blaine Donald Austin 
stated in open court when ask about temporomandibular joint 
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injuries (TMJ), one of Appellant's primary complaints, that this 
ligamentous damage can be caused by long term stress as well as 
trauma. Tr.000471 Tr.000499. He further testified that there are 
discussions in the academic world that whiplash is not one of the 
mechanisms that can cause TMJ problems. Tr.000498 Some of the most 
recent literature according to Appellants own oral surgeon 
indicates that there can be an accumulation of small injuries over 
a period of time, people getting hit with things which accumulate 
over time and then it (TMJ) will manifest itself somewhere along 
the way. Appellant did not consult with Dr. Austin until 4 months 
following the accident, it was noted that his assessment that the 
TMJ problem was from this accident was strictly from her account. 
Witness for the Defense, Crayton Walker, D.D.S., M.D. testified 
that in his opinion, " I doubt that the accident of December of 
1993 significantly contributed to her TMJ, because it was just such 
a low impact. The forces involved I doubt would cause the problem. 
In addition, I think that her problem was exaggerated by her 
psychological profile, her stress and strain in her life, and I 
think that there is a good chance that she can grind and clench her 
teeth. Patients could never have had an automobile accident and 
have he psychological profile and have the same findings on her TMJ 
as what Bonnie Tingey had." Tr* 000695. Further, Appellees' Bio-
mechical expert, Scott McClellan, testified regarding the Temporo-
mandibular joint injury that Ms. Tingey's daily activities of 
chewing and yawning put significantly more force on her Temporo 
mandibular joint than the forces in the accident. Tr.000825. 
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It was made known to the jury during examination of witnesses, 
that Appellant had been involved in a number of other accidents 
prior to this accident. Further, that some of these accidents were 
severe, and that she was in treatment at the time of this accident. 
Tr. 000504 In fact she had been referred to the University 
Hospital Pain Clinic in November of 1993, a month before this 
accident. Tr.000516 This referral was for the treatment of chronic 
pain Tr.000539. Chronic pain which existed long before this 
accident. Tr. 000543 This pain had been ongoing since the accident 
that occurred in October of 1990, more than three years before this 
accident. Tr.000553 The Appellant in describing her pain 
approximately three weeks prior to this accident described it as 
agonizing, pounding, torturing, wrenching, excruciating, tender, 
frightful, discomforting. Tr. 000572 
The physician for the Appellant's foot, James Gillis 
Maclntyre, M.D., testified that it was four months from the date of 
the accident until the time that he was consulted regarding 
Appellant's foot. Further, he testified that it was his 
understanding that this was the first time she had consulted or saw 
anyone regarding her foot pain. Tr.000457. In February 1994, two 
months following this accident, when Appellant filled out her 
questionnaire for the University Hospital Pain Clinic, she did not 
reference any injury to her foot.Tr. 000794 As part of her Pain 
Clinic questionnaire in February 1994, Bonnie Tingey reported that 
she was able to walk three miles a day. If her foot had been 
injured in the accident, that would not have been possible. 
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Dr Maclntyre's entire knowledge that her foot pain was related 
to the accident, came from Appellant's comments to him. Tr.000457 
Further, testimony was presented by the bio-mechanical expert, 
Scott McClellan, that a rear impact probably would not create a 
subluxation injury to the foot since it required a forward forcing 
motion and a rear collision forced the body to move backward not 
forward. Tr.000830 
In regards to Appellant's alleged loss of household services, 
Economist, Alan Stephens, testified that he was instructed by the 
Appellant to simply lay out the numbers and let the jury conclude, 
which part was related to which accident. Tr.000634. That is 
precisely what the jury did. The jury found that no loss of 
household services was related to this accident. 
Appellant attempts to show that the low jury verdict was not 
supported by the evidence, therefore, it must have been the product 
of passion and prejudice. On the contrary, the low verdict was 
supported by the evidence. 
The mere fact that the verdict in the mind of Appellant's 
counsel was small by itself, is not sufficient to indicate passion 
or prejudice without additional factors. In this case there are no 
additional factors. In Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 
123 (Utah 1974) it is stated that: 
. . . We can discover nothing in this case, 
except the amount of the verdict, which 
indicates passion or prejudice, and, as we 
have seen, passion and prejudice are not 
necessarily inferred from an excessive 
verdict, without more. No exception was taken 
to the jury or any member thereof. No conduct 
on the part of the jury, evincing passion and 
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prejudice, has been called to our attention. 
The only point of complaint is the size of 
verdict. 
Passion and prejudice is usually reserved for cases in which 
the jury has awarded an amount in excess of what would be expected. 
There could a variety of reasons why a jury might award an 
excessive amount after being inflamed or prejudiced. However, in 
the case at bar, the only fact that Appellant relies upon for the 
passion and prejudice is that Court allowed the disclosure of the 
fact that the Appellant's husband is an attorney. This disclosure 
alone not sufficient to show passion or prejudice by the jury, such 
that they would have disregarded their duty in making their award 
of damages. 
In Brunson v. Young, 412 P.2d 451, 17 Utah 2d 364 (Utah 1966) 
the Court stated that: 
When both sides have been given an opportunity 
to present their evidence and contentions to 
jury, and verdict has been rendered, all 
presumptions must support its validity and it 
must stand unless appellant shows that error 
was committed which had such an adverse effect 
upon trial that there is reasonable likelihood 
that result would have been different in its 
absence. 
There was no other evidence presented that might have aroused 
passion or prejudice causing the jury to award the Appellant a very 
small amount. In the case at bar the Appellant did not meet the 
burden of proof, and the jury was not convinced that the injuries 
claimed were sustained as a result of this accident, nor did they 
believe that she should be compensated for her alleged loss of 
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household services, which she could not prove. Further, Appellant 
testified that in filling out a document to describe her condition 
25 days before this accident, she recorded that she could only do 
50% of her household work. Tr.000804. Appellant also admitted to 
failing to disclose all of her prior accidents at the time of her 
deposition. Tr.000800-801. A fact that may have very possible 
affecting her credibility. 
Appellant would like you to believe that the proof of both the 
injuries and the economic loss arising from this accident was 
overwhelming. It was not, and the Appellant has not claimed that 
any new evidence to substantiate her claimed losses has surfaced. 
The jury in the subject case was ask by the Appellant to believe 
that this secondary impact to her vehicle, which did not even cause 
any visible damage to Appellant's vehicle, caused over $33,000 in 
medical expenses and caused Appellant to be so incapacitated that 
she could not perform her household chores. However, Appellant 
testified that prior to this accident she was experiencing pain 
which she described as stabbing, splitting, agonizing, pounding, 
torturing pain in the neck and head, and constant, killing and 
excruciating pain in the shoulders and back. Tr.000803-805 
The Appellant simply failed to prove her case that her 
injuries and problems were a result of this accident. 
Finally, there were 37 instructions presented to the jury. 
Instruction No. 23 notes the amount of reasonable value of health 
care services and supplies that had been stipulated as to have in 
fact been incurred, and left it to the jury to determine whether 
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they were sustained as a result of this accident or not. The jury 
concluded that $1459.92 of the medical specials were a result of 
this accident. Instruction No. 24 addresses Appellant's future 
loss of household services and earning capacity as well as 
projected future health care costs. The jury determined that there 
were no future loss of household services or future heath care 
costs as a result of this accident. Instruction No. 2 6 and 27 are 
Utah Jury Instruction which address pre-existing conditions and 
awards for those conditions. Appellant argues that his Colorado 
Jury instruction, if it had been allowed, would have changed the 
outcome of the award. We adamantly disagree. The jury was able to 
distinguish between each of Appellant's accidents and made the 
determination that the majority of the damages claimed were not a 
result of this accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jury appropriately awarded Appellant Special damages for 
expenses incurred the day of the accident, and nothing more. 
The jury initially did not award Appellant any general 
damages. However following the Court's instruction that because 
they had awarded some special damages, that they were required to 
award something in the way of general damages even though it may be 
nominal, they awarded Appellant the nominal amount of $1.00 in 
general damages. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury 
verdict. The verdict was not rendered under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. It was not in violation of the law nor were 
there any errors in law. This verdict was a just and fair verdict. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of 1997. 
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